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status of Nature is determined by the contexts within
which non-human entities are incorporated into human
cultural understanding. Since our ability to value the
non-human world is mediated by this understanding of
what Nature is, a contextualist environmental ethics
would direct our attention to the social and political
matrices within which human beings become cognizant
of that world.
At a time when contemporary philosophy
increasingly turns toward contextualist strategies of
inquiry, writers in environmental ethics still seem to
prefer the direct investigation of Nature itself. The
strategy ofcontemporary environmental ethics remains
predominately foundationalist By this I mean that it
defends its criticisms of human intervention in Nature
by an appeal to a standard ofconduct which lies outside
human thought and culture. It is supposed that if we
construe Nature as it really is in itself, then it will be
possible to apprehend the obligations which Nature
imposes upon human beings with the necessary
philosophical certainty. The foundationalist strategy
presupposes timeless criteria of moral relevance which
forever remain free of the vicissitudes of cultural
interpretation.
But this strategy no longer seems philosophically
plausible. Lying at the heart of this enterprise is the
assumption that we can be clear about what Nature

(1)

Does Nature have moral value? The belief that it
does lies at the heart of environmental ethics. Yet two
very different conceptions ofenvironmental ethics reveal
themselves when we consider how an answer to such a
question mightbejustified. Themostcommon approach
would have us investigate the properties which natural
beings possess. The assumption here is that when we
know what these properties are, we will be in a position
to deduce the value of Nature from a determination of
the moral relevance of these properties. Appeals to
sentience, self-consciousness, or lifeas criteria ofmoral
considerability are examples resulting from this type
of inquiry.
An alternative approach to environmental ethics,
which I shall call "contextualist," would have us
investigate the processes whereby Nature is construed
as something which either possesses or fails to possess
moral value. On this view, the value we should place on
Nature cannot be deduced from the way Nature is itself;
itdepends on the place which Nature has acquired in our
discourses with one another. In other words, the moral
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As an example of the force of this contextualist
premise, consider how beliefs about the value of
wilderness areas depend upon the cultural context from
within which it is perceived. When the Puritans first
settled the wilderness of New England, they found it to
be the grim and forbidding domain of Satan. Through
the lenses of Puritan religious convictions, wild Nature
possessed only negative value; religious duty demanded
that it be cut down, cultivated, and domesticated. 1
Following the advent of Romanticism, however,
landscape painting helped to fonn a more benign
relationship with those wilderness areas which fit the
criteriaof the picturesque and the sublime. Wild Nature
took on an aesthetic value which could then be used to
develop conservationist arguments of a moral kind. 2
But in contemporary society, the aesthetic value of
Nature as a spectacle must compete with economic
constructions of the wilderness. Not only do wilderness
areas contain valuable timber resources, but they offer
economic opportunities for hunting, fishing, and other
recreational uses with significant economic importance.
These uses often lead to a degradation of the aesthetic
values of wild areas.
These three perspectives construe Nature
differently; for one, Nature is a religious entity - the
domain of Satan - for another, it is an aesthetic entity
- a picturesque or sublime view - and for a third, it is
an economic entity - a commercially profitable
resource. Any answer to the question ofNature's moral
value, then, will necessarily be guided and informed by
our conception of the Nature which is intended. Thus,
inquiry into the moral status of Nature must inevitably
return to a moral and political investigation of the social
context within which Nature is constructed.
The view thatNature isconstructedwithinparticular
cultural contexts conflicts with the usual practice of
environmental ethics. Philosophers engaged in
environmental ethics tend to presuppose the existence
of a stable Nature that is both the victim of human
wrong-doing and the source of guidance on the proper
path of redemption. 3 Despite the internal differences
between them, most of the competing views about
environmental ethics agree on two things: first, the way
in which we ought to treat nonhuman entities follows
from the properties which those entities possess, so that
Nature's admittance to participant status in the moral
community depends upon its objective possession of
the relevant qualifying characteristics. And second, the

requires of us, since Nature is a detenninate something,
independent of our culturally based interpretation and
understanding of what it is. Nature is not something in
itself, but rather an artifact of human cultural life.
In order to pose the moral question ofourobligations
to Nature, we necessarily call before us a particular
conception of what Nature is. It is to Nature as it is
conceptualized and interpreted by historically situated
human beings that we relate, not the brute and
uninterpreted data of biological forces. To say that
Nature is an artifact is to say that we have no access to
a Nature in itself; our interpretation ofNature can never
be independent of the intellectual, artistic, emotional,
and technological resources available to us. These
resources constitute the matrix, orcontext, within which
what we call Nature appears to us and within which we
interpret our experiences of the world.
Moral reflection necessarily poses the question of
Nature's value from a standpoint that is contextualized
within this matrix. Thus, the inquiry into Nature's
moral status proceeds against the background ofa prior
interpretation and understanding ofjust what Nature is.
But this understanding itself presupposes the historically specific matrix from within which we begin our
interpretive effort. It follows from this that we cannot
answer the question concerning Nature's moral value
abstractly, that is, without frrst specifying a particular
way of knowing Nature and the concrete results of that
way ofknowing. That the moral valueoftheenvironment
depends upon a conception of Nature which in tum is
relative to a particular way of knowing the world, is the
contextualistpremiseforpracticing environmental ethics.
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Proponents of the "land ethic" articulated by Aldo
Leopold in A Sand. ~ Almanac criticize animal
liberation theories because they focus too narrowly on
the individual animal, with the result that they ignore the
ecological wholes of which individual animals are a
part. 6 While animal liberationists are primarily
concerned with our treatment of domestic animals, the
"land ethic" starts from a concern for wild biotic
communities. Our moral concern should not be to avoid
pain and suffering but, rather, to maintain the stability,
integrity, and beauty of the biotic community as a
whole. That is what has moral value. Thus, all aspects
of Nature come to have moral value, from this
perspective, insofar as they contribute to the stability,
integrity, and beauty of the ecosystem.
The "land ethic" thereby greatly extends the scope
of the moral community. Nonetheless, the argument
supposes that Nature can only make a moral claim on
human beings to the extent that it satisfies an objective
demand, namely, that the natural entity in question be
significant for the health of the ecosystem. If it does not
have that property, or if it in some way is a threat to the
health of the ecosystem, then that natural entity is
excluded from moral protection. Thus, some proponents
of the "land ethic" suppose that hunting is compatible
with their moral concern for the stability, integrity, and
beauty of the biotic community.7
Some members of the eco-feministmovementalso
follow the same sort of strategy.8 The common
commitment to foundationalism manifests itself
differentlyin eco-fern inism, however. The significance
ofthe eco-fern inist contribution to environmental ethics
lies in its recognition that the environmental crisis is not
merely a product of human relations to Nature. Rather,
it is a symptom of oppressive relations between hwnan
beings as well. They draw a connection, then, between
the culture's willingness to ignore the interests of nonhuman beings and the culture's willingness to ignore
and suppress the interests and needs ofwomen. Western
philosophy has consistently drawn a distinction between
culture and nature and associated men with culture and
women with nature. 9 Patriarchal control of Nature is
seen, therefore, as intimately bound up with patriarchal
control of women.
For more radical members of the eco-feminist
movement these parallels suggest the possibility that
women are in fact "closer to Nature" than men. While
men are fundamentally alienated from natural processes,

function of an environmental ethic is to help us to return
from our alienation from Nature so that we may live
more closely in harmony with it. This will happen when
we recognize that Nature qualifies for moral
consideration and act accordingly. But these two points
only make sense if we also agree that our understanding
of Nature and its moral law comes from unmediated
access to the way that Nature is in itself. If this is not
possible, then appeals to follow the dictates of Nature
reduce to appeals to do what is right, as that is defined
by theenvironmental ethic in question. Nature, therefore,
is unable to play the independent justificatory role
which foundationalist ethics requires of it
(2)
The idea that Nature should be our moral guide
appears in a nwnber of different guises, depending on
the moral theory in question. It informs the arguments
of those who deny that we have moral obligations to
Nature as well as those who affirm them. Let me clarify
what I mean by this.
In his Lectures Q!!. Ethics, Immanuel Kant denies
that we can have direct duties to animals because they
lack certain features necessary to participate in the
moral community.4 In particular, they lack the capacity
of reason and free will. Since animals do not possess
these properties, we can have no moral relations with
them directly, although we may have obligations
regarding animals. For example, if other human beings
will be adversely affectedby our mistreatment ofanimals,
then our direct obligations to other hwnan beings require
us not to mistreat animals. In any case, the question of
the moral standing of animals depends, for Kant, on the
objective properties which beings do or do not possess
independently of how we think about them. It follows
that Nature is disqualified from playing the role of
victim or of moral guide from the Kantian standpoint
The animal liberation movement attacks the Kantian
perspective but retains its foundationalist framework. 5
Peter Singerargues, for example, that to be a member of
the moral community a being must possess sentience,
that is, the capacity to feel either pleasure or pain. Any
being which has this property qualifies for moral respect,
those which do not, remain outside the protection of
moral strictures. Using this criterion, Singer extends
the moral community to include certain species of
animals which clearly can feel pleasure and pain.
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which Deep Ecology attacks, perceivesNature as inferior
to human nature because it lacks the properties of
rationality and freedom which are essential to human
moral Slams. Nature is thus perceived as out there to
satisfy human needs and purposes, perhaps "given" by
God for these ends.
For eco-feminism, on the other hand, it is the
exploitive impulse inherent in men, or in the male
principle as iUs manifested in patriarchal institutions,
which explains how it is possible for our culture to
marginalize Nature as a force in moral deliberation.
Patriarchal culture perceives Nature as an antagonist, an
opponent to be conquered, subdued, and overcome. It
perceives natural entities as competitors and threats
which must be neutralized. Such a cuIture is symbolized
by the male hunter who supposes that the life which is
most in harmony with Nature is one given to the pursuit
and killing of wild animals.!!
And for Marxists and anarchists, acertainblindness
towards the environment appears to be inherent in the
capitalist mode of production.! 2 Profit and efficiency
have not motivated ecologically responsible productive
practices. For the capitalist, Nature is perceived as a
source of raw materials for mass production. Drained of
moral value, it is a material universe to be used for the
increase of private profit and advantage in the most
economically efficient manner possible.
When I say that these are interpretive frameworks,
I mean that these explanations of the environmental
crisis do not just attack particular forms of human
action, butalso critique the particularwaysofconstruing
Nature which appear to justify the unwanted human
action. Deep Ecology, eco-feminism, Marxism, and
anarchism provide examples of the sort of frameworks
without which defining what is morally problematic
about human relations with the environment would be
impossible.
Once we recognize the presence of interpretive
frameworks such as those I have just identified, it
becomes clear that without such frameworks, 'Nature'
remains an empty term and the relevance of ethics to
Nature becomes completely undecidable. If this is so,
then Naturecan only guide us ifwe accept the framework
within which someparticularNature has already acquired
a meaning and a value for us. And if we oppose specific
human practices because of their effects on the
environment, then our critique cannot simply appeal to
Nature as foundation and legitimation, but, rather, must

women have managed to retain closer ties to Nature, and
are thus in a privileged position to care for Nature and
to guide the culture in its return to a way of life more in
harmony with Nature. But this position also evinces the
commitment to a Nature which exists independently of
human culture. If we are to make sense of the notion that
women are "closer to Nature" than men, we must frrst
make sense of the notion that there is an objective
Nature there to be "closer to" in thefrrstplace. Wemust
agree, in otherwords, that thesedualisms which separate
men from women and culture from Nature are not
merely patriarchal constructs, butreflections ofthe way
in which Nature truly is.
The positions which I have just identified all share
allegiance to the two points I mentioned earlier. They
agree that our moral obligations depend upon what
properties the object actually has and that a proper
understanding ofthese properties will allow us to return
to a close and hannonious moral relationship with the
natural world. In the rest of this paper I shall indicate
some aspects of the alternative position Iam proposing.
(3)

In order to make Nature our guide in matters of
morality we have to understand what Nature is. This, it
seems to me, is more problematic an undertaking than
many in environmental ethics suppose. Our
understanding of Nature is the product of cultural
institutions and the plurality of interpretations of the
natural world which they make available. Before we
can make Nature our moral guide, we must ask how our
present understanding of Nature was constructed and
how it has led us ontotheparticularpath ofenvironmental
destruction we currently follow. From that standpoint
we should ask not, how is Nature really constructed?
Rather, we should ask, what understanding of Nature
would support and sustain a life which is morally
responsible both towards the environment and towards
other human beings?
Several interpretive frameworks exist for
approaching the question of how to construe Nature,
although the cultural origins of these frameworks are
often obscured by their proponents. Formembers ofthe
Deep Ecology movement, for example, our problems
with the environment stem from our one-sided
anthropocentrism and concern with ever-increasing
material consumption.! 0 Theanthropocentric tradition,
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of landscape painting, travel posters, television
documentaries, and advertising photographs. These
images have two signiftcantfeatures. First. they construe
Nature as a spectacle that has value to the extent that it
possesses certain aesthetic visual qualities. Nature is
understood to be external to the everyday life of a
person, a place to visit for relaxation or ediftcation, like
a museum or zoo, but not a place in which to live. As
such, Nature is understood in terms ofthe masks held up
by the artist and the leisure industry.
The second feature of these images is that they
construct Nature as a commodity to be purchased by an
otherwise passive consumer. One buys the leisure
weekend, or the vacation package, in order to recuperate
from the everyday life of work. But this purchase
promotes only an external relation to what is purchased.
It is not a living interaction but a passive appreciation of
the spectacle, which one buys. And in the name of this
purchase the economy is licensed to continue to destroy
Nature through "business-as-usual" - to make the
leisure industry both possible and necessary - while
at the same time preserving selected bits of it for
selective enjoyment.
To say that our culture seeks to render Nature
invisible and to translate it into a human commodity
does not entail that it has been fully successful. The
unwillingness of people to move from economically
depressed rural areas on account of the "way oflife" that
is possible there, reveals the extent to which economic
rationality has failed to uniformly dominate the
deliberations of individuals. People do not, in fact,
think solely in terms of their economic advantage.
However, within the framework of a capitalist society,
such individuals expose themselves to the suspicion
that they must then be responsible for any consequent
economic harm which they suffer, since they have
failed to act in a fully rational manner. But that is
precisely the problem. What it is reasonable to do, and
what we can truly and literally say about the natural
world depend upon the discourses of the dominant
mode of thinking, in this case on capitalist economics
and the natural sciences. Alternative patterns ofthought
and action inevitably appear marginal and eccentric. As
such they are more easily ignored.
At this point, we must resist asking whether
economic and natural scientiftc discourses correctly
characterize Nature as it really is. Since what Nature is
is a function ofa particular way ofknowing and thinking

ftrst seem to uncover the process of construing Nature
which buttresses those practices and the habits ofthought
which motivate them. We might then try to articulate
new interpretations of Nature that would motivate
alternative practices.

(4)
Let me say something briefly about two ways in
which how we construe Nature in our present culture is
a reflection of thought patterns intrinsic to cultural
categories quite separate from any notion of a Nature in
itself. First, we live in a society whose economic health
depends upon expanding commodity production. We
should expect, therefore, that Nature will have been
enlisted to support this project. Second, we live in a
society which has gradually objectiftedhuman beings
in the process of transforming them into participants in
capitalist processes of production. We might expect,
therefore, to ftnd that Nature, too, has been objectifted
as a consequence of this procesS. 13 In order to see this,
we might ask, what interpretation of Nature would
support the demands for economic growth which are
part of the capitalist economy? Certainly, a view of
nonhuman entities as containing spirits, needs, interests,
or rights runs contrary to the desire to treat nature as a
mere source of raw materials. Rather than following
animistic constructions of Nature, our culture tends to
give priority to a vision of Nature constructed by the
natural sciences. This is true despite the fact that most
people are ill-equipped to comprehend the world which
is so constructed. 14 The dominance of the natural
scientific view of Nature as the site of merely physical
relations and forces does not just advance a particular
cognitiveproject It also gives legitimacy to the economic
and political interests of those engaged in commodity
production under present conditions by undermining
alternative construals of Nature which would invest it
with moral and aesthetic values capable of justifying a
moral critique of the prevailing social system. 1S
Mass production can proceed most efftciently if
Nature becomes invisible to human beings or is visible
only as a commodity in the production process itself. It
becomes invisible when the majority of the population
no longer live in direct contact with the land nor make
their livelihood from an understanding of the physical
objects and processes of the environment 16 For urban
culture, Nature regains its visibility in the visual images
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about it, we might instead ask, who is empowered and
who is subjugated by construing Nature in economic
and natural scientific terms?17 Putting the question this
way side-steps our impulse to engage a definition of
Nature as if all that were at stake was a question of fact.
It acknowledges the pragmatic or performative
dimension of any understanding of Nature. We are led,
that is, to evaluate the merits of a view of Nature not
simply according to the canons of scientific method or
economic efficiency, but also with regard to its practical
moral and political implications for our lives and what
we value. And this is no small matter. It is clear that the
dominant construal of Nature ignores and marginalizes
other forms of understanding and living in the world.
This makes it difficult for us to perceive other ways in
which Nature exists or to take seriously those who do
perceive the world in ways which deviate from the
mainstream perspective.

Nature in ways that are different from those which
currently sustain the mainstream activities of Westem
industrial cultures.
But what alternative do we really have, it might be
asked, given that we cannot simply decide to believe
that trees and animals have spirits or that they are gods,
justbecause that might be a view ofNature which would
limitouraggressionagainstit? Iamnotsurethataclear,
socially meaningful alternative does exist at the present
time. Nonetheless, there is a model for what we might
do if we take seriously the need to re-construe Nature as
a part of re-valuing it This model may be found in the
writings of literary naturalists.
It is significant that most of the great figures in the
environmentalist tradition are literary not philosophical
writers. Thoreau, Burroughs, Muir, Leopold, Abbe,
and Lopez, to name a few, all stand out as proponents of
a moral relationship with Nature, yet are best known for
their narrative depictions of particular settings, not for
their abstract, theoretical arguments. What this literary
tradition makes possible is a moral and philosophical
association with place which is not narrowly economic,
self-interested, orpolitical. Itre-introduces subjectivity
and moral connectedness into the landscape. Walden
Pond - to take the best know example - is no longer
just a small lake near Concord, Massachusetts.l 8 It
functions as a sign ofThoreau's ideas about the way one
should live life. As such, Walden Pond has become a
symbol which serves to recall Thoreau's writing and the
respect and admiration for natural beings which he
helped to promote. 19
In the language of rhetoric, naturalist literature
empowers the landscape through the figure of
metonymy.20 That is, the landscape acquires agency
through this literature because it creates a close
connection between places and particular ideas, values
and experiences. To say that the landscape can speak to
us is no more mystical and obscure than to say that the
White House denied all knowledge, or that the Church
announced its disapproval; all three are metonymic
statements. Thus the association ofparticular ideas and
narratives with landmarks in Natureprovides one avenue
by which Nature can be re-invested with a subjectivity
denied to it by current exploitive interpretations. The
broader task implied here is to incorporate physical into
social and moral geography in such a way that Nature
ceases to function invisibly, external to the everyday
life of human beings. 21

(5)
I am suggesting, then, that inquiry into Nature's
moral value cannot be separated from inquiry into the
ways in which we construe Nature to defend or attack
the economic, social, and political practices and
institutions of our society. It is no accident that the
environmentalistmovement has an uphill struggle trying
to argue that Nature has intrinsic moral value or moral
standing independent of human self-interest. Such
conclusions require that we understand and perceive
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Interpretive and Critical Essays (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987).

At a time when philosophers are acknowledging
that thepursuitofphilosophicalabsolutesandindubitable
certainties is a bankrupt project, it is unfortunate to find
the tradition of environmental ethics looking to Nature
to find justsuch treasures.22 Appeals to "follow Nature"
or to live in "harmony with Nature" mask the contexts
which have given birth to the image of Nature one is to
follow or harmonize with. If environmental ethics is to
be critical, then it must participate in the discourses
which construe Nature and reflect on the desires, needs,
and motivations whichconstitute thosediscourses. Only
from within this participation does it make sense to ask
the normative question, how ought we to relate to
Nature from the moral point of view?
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5. Statements of the animal liberation position include:
Tom Regan, All that Dwell Therein: Animal Rights and
Environmental Ethics (Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1982); The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983); Peter Singer, Animal
Liberation: a New E!hi££ for Our Treatment ofAnimals (New
York: Random House, 1975); Singer, ed., In Defense Qf
Animals (Basil Blackwell, 1985); and Regan and Singereds.,
Animal Rights and Hwnan Obligations (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
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found in Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The
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1982), and Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Montreal: Black Rose
Books, 1971); AndreGorz, Ecology as Politics (Boston: South
End Press, 1980).
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of the strategy of neutralizing opposition to capitalist work
conditions. This is useful because advertising is one of the

6. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford
University Press, 1966); see also, 1. Baird Callicott, In Defense
Qf the Land Ethic: Essays.in Environmental Philosophy
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), and
Callicott, ed., A Companion 1Q. A Sand County Almanac:

Summer 1990

107

Between the Species

How To Construe Nature: Environmental Ethics and the Interpretation ofNature

significant sources of our present understanding of what
Nature is.
14. George Steiner underlines the extent to which
mathematical and scientific languages are not translatable
into the natural languages of everyday discourse in '''The
Retreat from the Word" in George Steiner: A ~ (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984): pp.283-304.
15. Cf. William Leiss, TheDominationof~(Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974), especially Part Two, "Science,
Technology, and the Domination of Nature."
16. See Stuart Ewen, Ibid.
17. This question is inspired by Michel Foucault's
conception of power as expressed in ''Two Lectures" and
''Truth and Power" in PowerlKnow1edge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings. 1972-1977, ed. by Colin Gordon, trans. by
Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): pp.78-133.
18. Henry David Thoreau, Walden (Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1961).

Gi.nt he.vy perfumed m.gnoU. buds
The smooth voluptuous flesh of their peuls
Uke unmounted jewels on n.ked bnnches,
The uplifted .rms of the trees
Lost in .iry clouds of new green J.ce
Tr.ced .g.inst the d.rk winter pine.
P.le froth of pink blossom.
Young strong breezes
And endless sky.
Spring h.s come .g.in,

19. A "symbol" is a particular kind of sign. According to
C. S. Peirce, a symbol signifies its object because of a
conventional use of the sign to signify that particular object.
The conventionality of the signification differentiates symbols
from other signs such as icons or indexes. cf. Peirce, "Logic
as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs" in Philosophical Writings
of Peirce. ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover
Publications, 1955): pp.98-119.
20. The connection between symbols and metonymy is
made by Chaim Perelman inThe Realm ofRhetoric, trans. by
William Kluback (Notre Dame, London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1982): p.102.

hrth gives birth
hirer th.n I ever remember
As if to s.y:
This is my love story.
Look.t me.
C.nnot you see
How be.uUfui I .m.

21. These remarks are derived from Keith H. Basso's
essay on the use of geographical landmarks in the historical!
moral narratives of the Apache Indians to bind the moral
narrative to specific locations in the physical world of the
community. Cf. "'Stalking with Stories': Names, Places,
and Moral Narratives Among the Western Apaches" in On
Nature: Nature.Landsclq)e.andNatural~,ed. by Daniel
Halpern (San Francisco; North Point Press, 1987): pp.95-116.

Adore me.
I .m Goddess.
I.m
The He.rt of Mystery.

22. In Anglo-American philosophy, one of the most
influential figures in this attack on foundationalism has been
Richard RoTty. Cf. Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays
1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1982), and Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
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